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a b s t r a c t
A server-aided verification signature scheme consists of a digital signature scheme and
a server-aided verification protocol. With the server-aided verification protocol, some
computational tasks for a signature verification are carried out by a server, which is
generally untrusted; therefore, it is very useful for low-power computational devices. In
this paper, we first define three security notions for server-aided verification signatures,
i.e., existential unforgeability, security against collusion attacks and security against
strong collusion attacks. The definition of existential unforgeability includes the existing
security requirements in server-aided verification signatures. We then present, on the
basis of existing signature schemes, two novel existentially unforgeable server-aided
verification signature schemes. The existential unforgeability of our schemes can be
formally proved both without the random oracle model and using the random oracle
model.We also consider the security of server-aided verification signatures under collusion
attacks and strong collusion attacks. For the first time, we formally define security models
for capturing (strong) collusion attacks, and propose concrete server-aided verification
signature schemes that are secure against such attacks.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
For power-constrained devices such as smart cards and mobile terminals, additional care must be taken with crypto-
graphic algorithms due to the limited computational ability of those devices. Several techniques (e.g., pre-computation and
off-line computation) have thus been introduced and adopted in order to improve the efficiency of cryptographic protocols.
While such techniques can reduce the computational load, the computational requirement of many cryptographic systems
(especially those with excellent security features) still remains too heavy for low-power devices. Pairing computation on
elliptic curves is an example. Due to its elegant properties, pairing has been widely employed as a building block for lots
of cryptographic schemes, in particular in the construction of identity-based encryption and short signatures. However,
performing a pairing on an elliptic curve requires much more computational cost than executing an exponentiation
computation. It remains a challenging task to reduce the computational cost in pairing-based cryptography.
A promising solution is to employ a powerful server assisting the low-power device (we refer to this as the client) to carry
out cryptographic operations. This is known as ‘‘server-aided computation’’. If the server is fully trusted, computations can
be easily done through a secure channel between the client and the server. As an example, the client can send his/her private
key to the server, which then can act on behalf of the client to decrypt ciphertexts or sign messages, and return the result
to the client. However, the assumption of a fully trusted server seems too strong in practice, since clients are more likely to
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face an untrusted server which could try to extract the secret of the client (in decryption or signing) or respond with a false
result (in encryption or signature verification).
Many schemes for server-aided computation [1–12] have been proposed in the literature. A server-aided-verification
signature scheme SAV-Σ consists of a digital signature scheme (Σ) and a server-aided verification protocol. Signatures
can be verified by executing the server-aided verification protocol with the server, where the verification requires less
computation than the original verification algorithm of Σ . This notion was introduced by Quisquater and De Soete [13]
for speeding up RSA verification with a small exponent. Lim and Lee [14] introduced this idea into discrete-logarithm-
based schemes, by proposing efficient protocols for speeding up the verification of discrete-logarithm-based identity
proofs and signatures. Their constructions are based on the ‘‘randomization’’ of the verification equation [14]. A different
approach was introduced by Girault and Quisquater [15], which does not require pre-computation or randomization.
Their server-aided verification protocol [15] is computationally secure, based on the hardness of a sub-problem of the
underlying complexity problem in the original signature scheme. Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya considered server-aided
verification in the situation where the server is made up from two untrusted software packages, which are assumed not
to communicate with each other [14]. Under this assumption, it allows a very light public computation task (typically one
modular multiplication in the Schnorr scheme). Girault and Lefrance [16] proposed a more generalized model of server-
aided verification without the assumption in [14]. A generic server-aided verification protocol for digital signatures from
bilinear maps was also proposed [16]. Their protocol can be applied to signature schemes with similar constructions, such
as the BB signature scheme [17] and the ZSS signature scheme [18].
Motivations and Contributions.
The motivations of this paper are desires to formally define the security of server-aided verification signatures and to
construct new schemes that are secure under realistic security models. Giraul and Lefrance [16] made the first attempt to
define the security of server-aided verification signatures. Their definition consists of two aspects, namely the existential
unforgeability of the signature scheme and the soundness of the server-aided verification protocol. The former notion is
the same as that for digital signatures, and the latter requires that the server be unable to prove an invalid signature as
valid using the server-aided verification protocol. Although this definition captures the essence of server-aided verification
signatures, it is still worthwhile to definemore elaboratemodels for further research on server-aided verification signatures.
The contributions of this paper include three security models of server-aided verification signatures and concrete schemes
secure under the new models. Our contributions are outlined as follows.
First, we introduce and define the existential unforgeability of server-aided verification signatures (or EUF-SAV-Σ
for short). For server-aided verification signatures, we prove that EUF-SAV-Σ includes the existential unforgeability of
signature schemes and the soundness of server-aided verification protocols, under the same assumption [16], that the server
does not have any valid signature of the message when it tries to prove a signature of that message as valid. An existentially
unforgeable server-aided verification signature scheme ensures that even the server (without colluding with the signer) is
not able to forge a signature which can be proved to be valid by using the server-aided verification protocol.
Second, we consider the security of the ZSS signature [18] with the server-aided verification protocol proposed in [16].
The analysis shows that the server-aided verification ZSS in [16] can be made secure in our model, but requires more
computational cost than that claimed in [16]. This is due to the difference between the security model defined in this paper
and that in [16]. In our model, the server is allowed to execute the server-aided verification protocol with the verifier before
proving to the verifier that an invalid signature is valid. This, however, is not allowed in [16] when making the security
analysis of the server-aided verification ZSS. We believe that our model reflects a realistic case in real life.
Third, we introduce the server-aided verification for the Waters signature [19] and the BLS signature [20], respectively.
We provide the first construction of SAV-Waters and SAV-BLS. SAV-Waters inherits the desirable property of the Waters
signature, which can be proven to be existentially unforgeable without random oracles under the GBDH assumption. The
existential unforgeability of SAV-BLS can be reduced to the hardness of the BDH problem in the random oracle model.
Last, we consider collusion between a signer and a server, who collaboratively prove an invalid signature to be valid. Such
attacks were first sketched in [16] in the definition of ‘‘auxiliary non-repudiation’’. Previous definitions (including EUF-SAV-
Σ) are all based on the assumption that the malicious server does not have any valid signature of the message when it tries
to prove an invalid signature of that message to be valid. For the first time, this paper formally defines security models
for capturing the collusion attack and its stronger version in server-aided verification signatures, and proposes concrete
server-aided verification signature schemes for protection against collusion attacks.
Paper Organization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the notion of a server-aided verification signature
scheme (SAV-Σ) whose existential unforgeability is defined in Section 3. We then analyze the existential unforgeability of
a previously proposed SAV-Σ in Section 3. New constructions of existentially unforgeable SAV-Σ and the security analysis
are given in Section 4. After that, we define the collusion and adaptive chosenmessage attacks along with a stronger version
in Section 5. Concrete constructions of SAV-Σ secure against such attacks are also given in Section 5. Finally, we conclude
this paper in Section 6.1
1 The preliminary versions of two of the proposed protocols were published in [21] without security proofs.
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2. Server-aided verification signatures
In this section, we provide the definitions of a signature scheme and a server-aided verification signature scheme.
2.1. Syntax of a signature schemeΣ
A signature schemeΣ consists of the following algorithms:
Parameter-Generation: ParamGen(1k)→ param.
This algorithm takes as input a security parameter k and returns a string param, which denotes the common scheme
parameters, including the description of the message spaceM and the signature spaceΩ , etc. param is shared among all the
users in the system.
Key-Generation: KeyGen(param)→ (sk, pk).
This algorithm takes as input the system parameter param and returns a secret/public key pair (sk, pk) for a user in the
system.
Signature-Generation: Sign(param,m, sk, pk) = σ .
This algorithm takes as input the system parameter param, the message m and the key pair (sk, pk), and returns a
signature σ .
Signature-Verification: Verify(param,m, σ , pk)→ {Valid, Invalid}.
This algorithm takes as input the system parameter param, the message/signature pair (m, σ ) and the public key pk,
and returns Valid or Invalid. σ is said to be a valid signature of m under pk if Verify(param,m, σ , pk) outputs Valid.
Otherwise, σ is said to be invalid.
Completeness. Any signature properly generated by Sign can always pass through the verification in Verify. That is,
Verify(param,m, Sign(param,m, sk, pk), pk) = Valid.
Existential unforgeability ofΣ . The standard notion of security for a signature scheme is called existential unforgeability
under adaptive chosen message attacks [22], which is defined using the following game between a challenger C and an
adversaryA.
Setup. The challenger C runs the algorithms ParamGen and KeyGen to obtain system parameter param and one key pair
(sk, pk). The adversaryA is given param and pk.
Queries. Proceeding adaptively, the adversary A can request signatures of at most qs messages. For each sign query
mi ∈ {m1, . . . ,mqs}, the challenger C returns σi = Sign(param,mi, sk, pk) as the response.
Output. Eventually, the adversaryA outputs a pair (m∗, σ ∗) and wins the game if:
1. m∗ ∉ {m1, . . . ,mqs}; and
2. Verify (param,m∗, σ ∗, pk) = Valid.
We defineΣ-Adv A to be the probability that the adversaryAwins in the above game, taken over the coin tosses made by
A and the challenger.
Definition 1. A forger A is said to (t, qs, ε)-break a signature scheme Σ if A runs in time at most t , A makes at most qs
signature queries, andΣ-Adv A is at least ε. σ is (t, qs, ε)-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosenmessage attacks
if there exists no forger that (t, qs, ε)-breaks it.
2.2. Syntax of a server-aided verification signature scheme SAV-Σ
A server-aided verification signature scheme SAV-Σ consists of six algorithms: ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify,
SA-Verifier-Setup, and SA-Verify. The first four algorithms are the same as those in an ordinary signature schemeΣ defined
in Section 2.1, and the last two are defined as follows:
Server-Aided-Verifier-Setup:
SA-Verifier-Setup(param)→ VString.
This algorithm takes as input the system parameter param and returns the bit string VString, which contains the
information that can be pre-computed by the verifier. Note that VStringmight be the same as param if no pre-computation
is required.
Server-Aided Verification:
SA-Verify(Server(param), Verifier(m,σ ,pk,VString))→ {Valid, Invalid}.
SA-Verify is an interactive protocol, between Server and Verifier, who only has a limited computational ability and is
not able to perform all computations in Verify alone. Given the message/signature pair (m, σ ), as well as the public key pk
and the inner information VString, Verifier checks the validity of σ with the help of Server by running SA-Verify.
SA-Verify returns Valid if Server can convince Verifier that σ is valid. Otherwise, σ is said to be invalid.
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Completeness. There are two types of completeness in SAV-Σ:
1. Completeness of Σ . Any signature properly generated by Sign can always pass through the verification in Verify.
That is,
Verify(param,m, Sign(param,m, sk, pk), pk) = Valid.
2. Completeness of SA-Verify. An honest server can correctly convince the verifier about the validity of a signature.
That is,
SA-Verify(Server(param), Verifier(m,σ ,pk,VString)) = Verify(param,m, σ , pk).
2.3. Computation-Saving in SAV-Σ
Computation-Saving is probably is the most obvious property that can distinguish a server-aided verification signature
scheme SAV-Σ from an ordinary signature schemeΣ . This property enables the verifier in SAV-Σ to check the validity of
signatures in a more computationally efficient way than that inΣ . This property is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Computation-Saving). Let Φ-Verify and Φ-SA-Verify denote the verifier’s computational cost in Verify
and SA-Verify, respectively. A server-aided verification signature scheme SAV-Σ is said to be Computation-Saving if
Φ-SA-Verify is strictly less thanΦ- Verify, i.e.,Φ-SA-Verify< Φ- Verify.
3. Existentially unforgeable SAV-Σ
It is clear that the security of SAV-Σ must include two security notions: existential unforgeability of Σ (EUF-Σ) and
the soundness of SA-Verify (Soundness-SA-Verify). The former is the same as that in Definition 1, while the latter is a new
notion and only appears in the scenario of SAV-Σ . As usual, the soundness notion requires that the server should not be able
to use SA-Verify to convince the verifier that an invalid signature is valid. The formal definition of the soundness depends
on the assumption about the server. Below we will give the first security model of SAV-Σ under the same assumption as
in [16]. We will define another model under different assumptions in Section 5.
3.1. Definition of existential unforgeability of SAV-Σ
Our first model follows the assumption in [16], namely, the server does not have the valid signature of themessagewhen
it tries to use SA-Verify to convince the verifier that an invalid signature of that message is valid. Under this assumption, it
is not necessary to consider EUF-Σ and Soundness-SA-Verify separately. Instead, we will give a unified notion, called the
existential unforgeability of SAV-Σ (or EUF-SAV-Σ for short), which implies EUF-Σ and Soundness-SA-Verify.
Briefly, EUF-SAV-Σ requires that the adversary should not be (computationally) capable of producing a signature of a
new message which can be proved as Valid by SA-Verify, even if the adversary acts as Server. A formal game-based
definition is described as follows.
Setup. The challenger C runs the algorithms ParamGen, KeyGen and SA-Verifier-Setup to obtain system parameter
param, one key pair (sk, pk) and VString. The adversaryA is given param and pk.
Queries. The adversaryA can make the following queries:
Signature Queries. Proceeding adaptively, the adversary A can request signatures of at most qs messages. For
each sign querymi ∈ {m1, . . . ,mqs}, the challenger C returns σi = Sign(param,mi, sk, pk) as the response.
Server-Aided Verification Queries. Proceeding adaptively, the adversary A can make at most qv server-aided
verification queries. For each query (m, σ ), the challenger C responds by executing SA-Verify with the
adversary A, where the adversary A acts as Server and the challenger C acts as Verifier. At the end of
each execution, the challenger returns the output of SA-Verify to the adversaryA.
Output. Eventually, the adversaryA outputs a pair (m∗, σ ∗) and wins the game if:
1. m∗ ∉ {m1, . . . ,mqs}; and
2. SA-Verify (A(param,InnerInfo),C(m∗,σ∗,pk,VString)) = Valid, where InnerInfo refers to the inner information
ofA (e.g., the random element) in the generation of σ ∗.
We define SAV-Σ-Adv A to be the probability that the adversaryAwins in the above game, taken over the coin tossesmade
byA and the challenger.
Definition 3. A forgerA is said to (t, qs, qv, ε)-break aSAV-Σ ifA runs in time atmost t , makes atmost qs signature queries
and qv server-aided verification queries, and SAV-Σ-Adv A is at least ε. A SAV-Σ is (t, qs, qv, ε)-existentially unforgeable
under adaptive chosen message attacks if there exists no forger that (t, qs, qv, ε)-breaks it.
When discussing security in the random oracle model, we add a fifth parameter qh to denote an upper bound on the number
of queries that the adversary makes to the random oracle.
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Remarks on EUF-SAV -Σ . We note that in Setup, VString is not provided to the adversary who now is acting as Server.
This is due to the concern that VStringmight contain some private information of the verifier, which must be kept secret
in server-aided verification signatures. We can see that in the definition, adversaryA acts as the server and the challenger
C acts as the verifier. This will help A to extract some information from VString. There is no need to consider the other
case where A acts as the verifier and C acts as the (honest) server, as A can perform all of the computations of an honest
server.
We will show in Section 3.3 that the adversary defined in the above model is stronger than that in [16].
3.2. Further observations on EUF-SAV-Σ
We will show the relationships among EUF-SAV-Σ , EUF-Σ and Soundness-SA-Verify.
It is self-evident that EUF-SAV-Σ guarantees Soundness-SA-Verify. Otherwise, if there is an adversary that can prove
that an invalid signature is valid by SA-Verifywith success probability ε, then it can also break the existential unforgeability
of SAV-Σ with the same probability. We now prove that EUF-SAV-Σ also implies EUF-Σ .
Theorem 1. If SAV-Σ is (t, qs, qv, ε)-existentially unforgeable, thenΣ is (t, qs, ε)-existentially unforgeable.
Proof. Let the ordinary signature scheme be Σ =(ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify), and its server-aided verification
counterpart be SAV-Σ =(Σ , SA-Verifier-Setup, SA-Verify). We prove the correctness of this theorem by converting a
(t, qs, ε) forgerΣA to a (t, qs, 0, ε) forger SAV-ΣA.
As defined in the game in Section 3.1, SAV-ΣA will obtain (param, pk) from its challenger of SAV-Σ . Then, SAV-ΣA acts
as the challenger ofΣA as follows.
Setup. (param, pk) is given toΣA.
Queries. For each signature query mi from ΣA, SAV-ΣA forwards mi to its challenger as a signature query of SAV-Σ . As
defined, σi = Sign(param,m, sk, pk) will be returned as the answer. SAV-ΣA then forwards σi to ΣA. It is clear
that each signature query fromΣA can be correctly answered.
Output. After making queries,ΣA will output a pair (m∗, σ ∗). SAV-ΣA sets (m∗, σ ∗) as its own output.
If ΣA(t, qs, ε)-breaks the signature scheme Σ , then m∗ is not one of the signature queries and Pr[Verify(param,m∗,
σ ∗, pk) = Valid] ≥ ε. Due to the completeness of SAV-Σ , if Verify(param,m∗, σ ∗, pk) = Valid, then SA-Verify will
return Valid as well. Therefore, SAV-ΣA wins the game with the same probability ε, without making any server-aided
verification queries. This completes the proof. 
3.3. Analysis of the SAV-Σ in Asiacrypt’05
In this section, we consider the existential unforgeability of the generic SAV-Σ proposed by Girault and Lefranc [16].
Their server-aided verification protocol applies to signature schemes whose verification algorithms are similar to those in
ZSS [18] and BB [17] signatures. We first review some fundamental background related to the protocol.
Bilinear Mapping: LetG1 andGT be two groups of prime order p and let g be a generator ofG1. The map e : G1×G1 → GT
is said to be an admissible bilinear mapping if the following three conditions hold true:
• e is bilinear, i.e., e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab for all a, b ∈ Zp.
• e is non-degenerate, i.e., e(g, g) ≠ 1GT .• e is efficiently computable.
We say that (G1,GT ) are bilinear groups if there exists the bilinear mapping e : G1 × G1 → GT as above, and e, and the
group action inG1 andGT can be computed efficiently. Such groups can be built fromWeil pairing or Tate pairing on elliptic
curves.
The Description of SAV-ZSS [16]
1. ParamGen. Let (G1,GT ) be bilinear groups where |G1| = |GT | = p, for some prime number p ≥ 2k, k be the system
security number and g be the generator of G1. e denotes the bilinear map G1 × G1 → GT . There is one cryptographic
hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → Zp. The system parameter param = (G1,GT , k, g, p, e, h).
2. KeyGen. The signer picks a random number x ∈ Z∗p and keeps it as the secret key. The public key is set as pk = gx.
3. Sign. For a messagem to be signed, the signer uses its secret key to generate the signature σ = g 1h(m)+x .
4. Verify. For a message/signature pair (m, σ ), everyone can check whether e(σ , gh(m) ·pk) ?= e(g, g). If the equation holds,
output Valid. Otherwise, output Invalid.
5. SA-Verifier-Setup. Given the system parameter param = (G1,GT , k, g, p, e, h), the verifier picks a random integer t in
Zp and computes K1 = e(g, g)t . The VString is (t, K1).
6. SA-Verify. The verifier and the server interact with each other using the protocol described in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. SA-Verify in SAV-ZSS [16].
Security of SAV-ZSS [16]. We now show that SAV-ZSS [16] is insecure in the model defined in Section 3.1, if the same (t, K1)
is used in each execution of SA-Verify described in Fig. 1.
We first briefly review the security conclusion of SAV-ZSS proved in [16]:
1. A malicious server is not able to convince a verifier that an invalid signature of a message m is valid by using SA-Verify
in Fig. 1, if:
2. The server does not know the ZSS signature of m and k-BCAA problem is hard (please refer to [16] for the definition of
k-BCAA).
However, the malicious server considered in [16] is not allowed to execute SA-Verify with the verifier, before it tries to
prove to the verifier that an invalid signature is valid. We believe that this restriction is not reasonable, as the verifier
in the real world would execute SA-Verify with the server several times. In the model defined in Section 3.1, we allow
the adversary (acting as the server) to choose any message–signature pair, and execute SA-Verify with the challenger
(acting as the verifier). This is analogous to the definition of existential unforgeability, where the forger is allowed to obtain
valid signatures of messages chosen by itself. Under this model, SAV-ZSS [16] will be insecure2 if the same (t, K1) is used
in SA-Verify in Fig. 1. The following shows how the adversary in our model can break the existential unforgeability of
SAV-ZSS [16]:
1. The adversaryA first issues a signature query on a messagem. Let the response from the challenger be σ .
2. Amakes a server-aided verification request (m, σ ). As shown in SA-Verify in Fig. 1, the challengerwill send the adversary
R = (gh(m) · pk)t .
3. A computes K2 = e(σ , R). As σ is a valid ZSS signature ofm, K1 = K2 = e(g, g)t .
4. With the knowledge of K1, A is able to prove that any invalid signature is valid if the same (t, K1) is used in SA-Verify.
To do that,A just sends K1 to the challenger in every execution of SA-Verify. Thus,A can always win the game defined
in Section 3.1.
It is clear that the above attack will not work if the verifier pre-computes qv + 1 pairs (t, K1) in SAV-ZSS [16] and the
adversary is allowed to make at most qv server-aided verification queries. This will require more storage space for the
verifier. Alternatively, the verifier can choose different t , and compute (gH(m) · pk)t and e(g, g)t in each execution of
SA-Verify. This however will lead to one more exponentiation in GT than the computational cost of the verifier claimed
in [16].
4. Existentially unforgeable SAV-BLS and SAV-Waters
This section describes new server-aided verification signature schemes: SAV-Waters and SAV-BLS, respectively.
4.1. Complexity assumptions
The bilinear mapping that we used in our protocol is the same as that defined in Section 3.3.
Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Problem (BDH). Given (g, ga, gb, gc) for some a, b, c ∈ Z∗p , compute e(g, g)abc ∈ GT . An algorithm
A has advantage ε in solving BDH on (G1,GT ) if
Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc) = e(g, g)abc : a, b, c ∈R Z∗p] ≥ ε.
The probability is over the uniform random choice of a, b, c from Z∗p , and over the coin tosses ofA.
2 SAV-ZSS in [16] is still secure against the adversary defined in [16]. However, the adversary in [16] is weaker than the one defined in this paper.
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Fig. 2. The SAV protocol for the Waters signature.
Table 1
Comparisons I.
Verification Pairing Exponentiation onGT Multiplication on G1
Waters 2 0 n
SAV-Waters 1 1 n
Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Assumption. The (t, ε)-BDH assumption holds on (G1,GT ) if no t-time adversary has advantage
at least ε in solving BDH on (G1,GT ).
Decisional Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Oracle ODBDH on (G1,GT ). Given (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)d), this oracle outputs ‘‘1’’ if it is
a BDH-tuple or ‘‘0’’ otherwise.
Gap Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Problem (GBDH). Given (g, ga, gb, gc) for some a, b, c ∈ Z∗p , compute e(g, g)abc ∈ GT with
the help of decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman oracleODBDH. An algorithmA has advantage ε in solving DBDH on (G1,GT ) if
Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc,ODBDH) = e(g, g)abc : a, b, c ∈R Z∗p] ≥ ε.
The probability is over the uniform random choice of a, b, c from Z∗p , and over the coin tosses ofA.
Gap Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Assumption. The (t, ε)-GBDH assumption holds on (G1,GT ) if no t-time adversary has
advantage at least ε in solving GBDH on (G1,GT ).
4.2. Existentially unforgeable SAV-Waters
Our first protocol is based on the Waters signature [19].
1. ParamGen. Let (G1,GT ) be bilinear groups where |G1| = |GT | = p, for some prime number p ≥ 2k, k be the system
security number and g be the generator of G1. e denotes the bilinear mapping G1 × G1 → GT . The system parameter
param = (G1,GT , k, g, p, e). The message spaceM = {0, 1}n.
2. KeyGen. Given the system parameters (G1,GT , k, g, p, e), the signer generates the public key pk as (v⃗, PK) and sk = x,
where v⃗ is a vector consisting of n+ 1 elements V0, V1, V2, . . . , Vn randomly selected in G1 and PK = e(g, g)x, where x
is a random element in Zp.
3. Sign. For an n-bit messagem in {0, 1}n, letM ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all i for which the ith bit ofm is 1. The signature
σ is constructed as σ = (σ1, σ2) = (gx(V0∏i∈M Vi)r , g r), where r ∈R Zp.
4. Verify. For a claimed signature σ = (σ1, σ2) of a message m, this algorithm outputs Valid if and only if e(σ1, g) =
PK · e(V0∏i∈M Vi, σ2). Otherwise, it outputs Invalid.
5. SA-Verifier-Setup. Given the system parameters (G1,GT , k, g, p, e), the verifier randomly chooses d ∈ Z∗p , then
calculates D = gd. The VString is (d,D).
6. SA-Verify. The verifier and the server interact with each other using the protocol described in Fig. 2.
Computation-Saving. From Table 1, we replace the pairing operation e(σ1, g) in the Verify algorithm with one
exponentiation on GT . Thus, we haveΦ- SA-Verify< Φ-Verify.
Theorem 2. The SAV-Waters described above is (t, qs, qv, ε)-existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks if the
(t + c(G1,GT )(qs + qv + 1), ε8qsqv(n+1) )-GBDH assumption holds on (G1,GT ). Here, c(G1,GT ) is a constant that depends on
(G1,GT ).
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Proof. We will prove that if there is a (t, qs, qv) adaptively chosen message such that adversary A wins the game defined
in Section 3.1 with probability ε, then there exists another algorithm B which can solve a random instance of the gap
bilinear Diffie–Hellman problem in time t + c(G1,GT )(qs + qv + 1) with success probability ε8qsqv(n+1) . This contradicts the
(t + c(G1,GT )(qs + qv + 1), ε8qsqv(n+1) )-GBDH assumption on (G1,GT ).
Let (G1,GT ) be bilinear groups of prime order p. AlgorithmB is given g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G1 which is a random instance of the
GBDH problem. Its goal is to compute e(g, g)abc . AlgorithmB will simulate the challenger and interact with the adversaryA
as described below.A can adaptively make Signature Queries and Server-Aided-Verification Queries. To make the proof
clearer, we introduce the notion of ‘‘special pair ’’. Let Mv be the set of A’s server-aided verification queries in the game. A
message–signature pair (m, σ ) ∈ Mv is a special pair if:
1. by running SA-VerifyA can convince the challenger that (m, σ ) is a valid message–signature pair; and
2. m has not appeared as one of the signature queries whenAmakes the server-aided verification query (m, σ ).
We now define the following two events:
• E1: There is a special pair inMv .
• E2: There is no special pair inMv .
It is clear that either E1 or E2 happens in the game, and thus Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] = 1.
The Event Succ|E1. If the event E1 happens, then there is a special pair in A’s server-aided-verification queries. B picks a
random integer j in {1, 2, . . . , qv}, and guesses this is the index of the first special pair.
1. Setup.B first sets an integer z = 4qs, and chooses an integer k, where k∈R{0, 1, . . . , n}. ThenB chooses random (n+1)-
length vectors α⃗ = (αi) and β⃗ = (βi), where αi ∈R{0, 1, . . . , z} and βi ∈R Zp, respectively.
Meanwhile, for a messagem ∈ {0, 1}n, we setM ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} as the set of all i for which the ith bit ofm is 1. Then
we define three functions:
F(m) = (p− zk)+ α0 +
−
i∈M
αi;
J(m) = β0 +
−
i∈M
βi;
K(m) =

0, if α0 +
−
i∈M
αi ≡ 0(mod z),
1, otherwise.
B sets g1 = ga, g2 = gb and D = gc where ga, gb and gc are the inputs of the GBDH problem. B then calculates
V0 = gp−kz+α01 gβ0 , Vi = gαi1 gβi , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, PK = e(g1, g2), and sets v⃗ = (Vi), the public key pk = (v⃗, PK).
2. Signature Queries. At any time the adversaryA can request the signature of the inputm.
(a) If K(m) = 0,B terminates the simulation and reports failure.
(b) Otherwise, K(m) ≠ 0 which implies F(m) ≠ 0,B chooses r ∈R Zp, and generates the signature as
σ = (σ1, σ2) =

g
−J(m)
F(m)
2

V0
∏
i∈M
Vi
r
, g
−1
F(m)
2 g
r

.
σ is a valid signature as shown below.
Let r˜ = r − bF(m) ; we have
σ1 = g
−J(m)
F(m)
2

V0
∏
i∈M
Vi
r
= g
−J(m)
F(m)
2 (g
F(m)
1 g
J(m))r
= gabg−abg
−J(m)
F(m)
2 (g
F(m)
1 g
J(m))r
= gab(gF(m)1 g J(m))
−b
F(m) (gF(m)1 g
J(m))r
= gab(gF(m)1 g J(m))r−
b
F(m)
= gab

V0
∏
i∈M
Vi
r˜
.
And σ2 = g
−1
F(m)
2 g
r = g r− bF(m) = g r˜ .
W. Wu et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 61 (2011) 1705–1723 1713
3. Server-Aided-Verification Queries. At any time the adversaryA canmake a Server-Aided-Verification query of (ml, σl),
where σl = (σl1, σl2).
(a) For l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , qv} and l < j:• Ifml has not appeared as one of the Signature Queries,B will execute the server-aided-verification protocol with
A but output Invalid at the end of the protocol, no matter whatA’s response is in the protocol. It is clear that if
B’s guess of a special pair is correct, thenB’s output will be correct as well.
• Otherwise, A has made a signature query of ml; let B’s answer be σ ′l = (σ ′l1, σ ′l2). In this case, B will execute
the protocol with A. First, B sends (σl1,D) to A. Then, A responds with K1l. After that B computes θ = σl2σ ′l2 ,
ϑ = V0∏i∈M Vi, λ = K1le(σ ′l1,D) , and issues the query (g, θ, ϑ,D, λ) to OGBDH. Finally, B will output Valid if OGBDH
returns 1. Otherwise, the output is Invalid.
Note that if OGBDH returns 1, i.e. λ = e(θ, ϑ)c , then we have
K1l
e(σ ′l1,D)
= e

σl2
σ ′l2
, V0
∏
i∈M
Vi
c
K1l = e(σ ′l1,D) · e

σl2
σ ′l2
, V0
∏
i∈M
Vi
c
= e(g, g)abc · e

σ ′l2, V0
∏
i∈M
Vi
c
· e

σl2
σ ′l2
, V0
∏
i∈M
Vi
c
= e(g, g)abc · e

σl2, V0
∏
i∈M
Vi
c
=

PK · e

σl2, V0
∏
i∈M
Vi
c
,
which means σl is valid according to the protocol described in Fig. 2. Otherwise OGBDH returns 0, and σl is invalid.
(b) For l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , qv} and l = j, let (m∗, σ ∗) be the lth query where σ ∗ = (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ). After receiving D fromB,Awill
send K ∗1 toB. As (m∗, σ ∗) is a special pair,A can prove it as valid by using the protocol SA-Verify described in Fig. 2.
B will receive K ∗1 such that
K ∗1 = (PK · K ∗2 )c = e(g, g)abce

σl2, V0
∏
i∈M
Vi
c
= e(g, g)abce((gF(m∗)1 g J(m
∗))r
∗
,D).
Ifα0+∑i∈M∗ αi = kz, then K ∗1 = e(g, g)abce((σ ∗2 )J(m∗),D).B can solve the GBDHproblemby computing e(g, g)abc =
K ∗1 /e((σ
∗
2 )
J(m∗),D) and terminate the simulation.
B can output e(g, g)abc if and only if
(a) B does not abort during Signature Queries; the probability that this event happens is Pr[qsi=1 K(mi) = 1].
(b) B makes a correct guess of a special pair, which happens with the probability 1qv . This also guarantees that beforeB
terminates the simulation, all server-aided-verification queries fromA can be correctly answered.
(c) The above two events happen and α0 +∑i∈M∗ αi = kz in the special pair (m∗, σ ∗).
Therefore, the probability thatB can successfully output e(g, g)abc is 1qv Pr[
qs
i=1 K(mi) = 1 ∧ α0 +
∑
i∈M∗ αi = kz].
We have
Pr

qs
i=1
K(mi) = 1 ∧ α0 +
−
i∈M∗
αi = kz

=

1− Pr

qs
i=1
K(mi) = 0

Pr

α0 +
−
i∈M∗
αi = kz|
qs
i=1
K(mi) = 1

≥

1−
qs−
i=1
Pr[K(mi) = 0]

Pr

α0 +
−
i∈M∗
αi = kz|
qs
i=1
K(mi) = 1

=

1− qs
z

Pr

α0 +
−
i∈M∗
αi = kz|
qs
i=1
K(mi) = 1

=

1− qs
z
 1
(n+ 1) Pr

K(m∗) = 0 qs
i=1
K(mi) = 1

=

1− qs
z
 1
(n+ 1)
Pr[K(m∗) = 0]
Pr
[ qs
i=1
K(mi) = 1
] Pr qs
i=1
K(mi) = 1|K(m∗) = 0

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≥

1− qs
z
 1
(n+ 1)
1
z
Pr

qs
i=1
K(mi) = 1|K(m∗) = 0

=

1− qs
z
 1
z(n+ 1)

1− Pr

qs
i=1
K(mi) = 0|K(m∗) = 0

≥

1− qs
z
 1
z(n+ 1)

1−
qs−
i=1
Pr[K(mi) = 0|K(m∗) = 0]

=

1− qs
z
 1
z(n+ 1)

1− qs
z

≥ 1
z(n+ 1)

1− 2qs
z

= 1
8qs(n+ 1) .
Therefore, Pr[Succ|E1] ≥ 18qsqv(n+1) .
The Event Succ|E2. If the event E2 happens, then there is no special pair inA’s server-aided-verification queries.
1. Setup, Signature Queries.B responds to these queries in the same way as was described in the case Succ|E1.
2. Server-Aided-VerificationQueries. At any timewhen the adversaryA canmake a Server-Aided-Verification query of the
input (ml, σl),B answers the query in the sameway as is described in the first scenario (3(a)) of Server-Aided-Verification
Queries of the first event E1.
If B does not abort during the simulation, A will output a message/ signature pair (m∗, σ ∗) where σ ∗ = (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 )
with the restriction described in Section 3.1. If A can prove σ ∗ as a valid signature by the SA-Verify protocol described
in Fig. 2, then A will return D∗ to B such that K ∗1 = e(g, g)abce(σ ∗2 , V0
∏
i∈M Vi)c . B can calculate e(g, g)abc = K ∗1 /
e(σ ∗2 , V0
∏
i∈M Vi)c .
B can calculate e(g, g)abc if and only if:
(a) B does not abort during Signature Queries; the probability that this event happens is Pr[qsi=1 K(mi) = 1].
(b) B makes a correct guess of the special pair, which happens with the probability 1qv . This also guarantees that before
B terminates the simulation, all server-aided-verification queries fromA can be correctly answered.
(c) The above two events happen and α0 +∑i∈M∗ αi = kz in the pair (m∗, σ ∗).
Therefore in this event, the probability thatB can successfully output e(g, g)abc is
Pr[Succ|E2] = Pr

qs
i=1
K(mi) = 1 ∧ α0 +
−
i∈M∗
αi = kz

· ε
≥ 1
8qs(n+ 1) · ε.
Above all,B can solve the GBDH problem with the probability
Pr[Succ] = Pr[Succ|E1] Pr[E1] + Pr[Succ|E2] Pr[E2]
≥ 1
qv
1
8qs(n+ 1) · Pr[E1] +
1
8qs(n+ 1) · ε · Pr[E2]
≥ 1
qv
1
8qs(n+ 1) · ε · (Pr[E1] + Pr[E2])
= ε
8qsqv(n+ 1) .
AlgorithmB’s running time is the same asA’s running time plus the time that it takes to respond to qs signature queries,
qv verification queries and compute e(g, g)abc fromA’s output. Assume that each takes time c(G1,GT ). Hence, the total running
time is at most t + c(G1,GT )(qs + qv + 1). This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
4.3. Existentially unforgeable SAV-BLS
Our second protocol is based on the BLS signature [20]. The description of our protocol is as follows.
1. ParamGen. Let (G1,GT ) be bilinear groups where |G1| = |GT | = p, for some prime number p ≥ 2k, k be the system
security number and g be the generator of G1. e denotes the bilinear map G1 × G1 → GT . There is one cryptographic
hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G1. The system parameter param = (G1,GT , k, g, p, e,H).
2. KeyGen. The signer picks a random number x ∈ Z∗p and keeps it as the secret key. The public key is set as pk = gx.
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Fig. 3. SA-Verify in SAV-BLS with EUF.
Table 2
Comparisons II.
Verification Pairing Exponentiation onGT Map-to-point
BLS 2 0 1
SAV-BLS 1 1 1
3. Sign. For a messagem to be signed, the signer uses its secret key to generate the signature σ = H(m)x.
4. Verify. For a message/signature pair (m, σ ), everyone can check whether e(σ , g) ?= e(H(m), pk). If the equation holds,
output Valid. Otherwise, output Invalid.
5. SA-Verifier-Setup. Given the system parameters (G1,GT , k, g, p, e,H), the verifier V randomly chooses r ∈ Zp and sets
R = g r . The VString is (r, R).
6. SA-Verify. The verifier V and the server S interact with each other using the protocol described in Fig. 3.
Computation-Saving. From Table 2, the verifier in SAV-BLS described above needs to compute one pairing, one
exponentiation on GT , and one map-to-point hash. It is obvious thatΦ- SA-Verify< Φ-Verify.
Security Proof of Existentially Unforgeable SAV-BLS
Theorem 3. The SAV-BLS signature scheme is (t, qs, qv, qh, ε)-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosenmessage attacks
if the (t + c(G1,GT )(qh + 2qs + 2qv + 1), εeqv(qs+1) )-BDH assumption holds on (G1,GT ). Here, c(G1,GT ) is a constant that depends
on (G1,GT ) and e is the base of the natural logarithm.
Proof. Wewill prove that if there is a (t, qs, qv, qh) adaptively chosenmessage adversary such thatAwins the game defined
in Section 3.1 with probability ε, then there exists another algorithm B which can solve a random instance of the bilinear
Diffie–Hellman problem in time t ′ = t + c(G1,GT )(qh+ 2qs+ 2qv + 1)with success probability εeqv(qs+1) . This contradicts the
(t ′, ε
eqv(qs+1) )-BDH assumption on (G1,GT ).
We employ a technique similar to that in [20] and regard the hash functions H as the random oracle. In the game, A
can adaptively make H queries, Signature Queries and Server-Aided Verification Queries. To make the proof clearer,
we introduce the notion of a ‘‘special pair ’’. Let Mv be the set of A’s server-aided verification queries in the game. A
message–signature pair (m, σ ) ∈ Mv is a special pair if:
1. by running SA-VerifyA can convince the challenger that (m, σ ) is a valid message–signature pair; and
2. m has not appeared as one of the signature queries whenAmakes the server-aided verification query (m, σ ).
We now define the following two events:
• E1. There is a special pair inMv .
• E2. There is no special pair inMv .
It is clear that either E1 or E2 happens in the game, and thus Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] = 1.
Let (G1,GT ) be bilinear groups of prime order p. Algorithm B is given g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G1 which is a random instance of
the BDH problem. Its goal is to compute e(g, g)abc . AlgorithmB will simulate the challenger and interact with the adversary
A as described below. Let Succ be the event thatB solves the given instance of the BDH problem; then we have
Pr[Succ] = Pr[Succ ∧ E1] + Pr[Succ ∧ E2] = Pr[Succ|E1] Pr[E1] + Pr[Succ|E2] Pr[E2].
We now consider each probability individually.
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The Event Succ|E1. If the event E1 happens, then there is a special pair in A’s server-aided verification queries. At the
beginning of the simulation, B picks a random integer j in {1, 2, . . . , qv}, and lets j be its guess of the index of the first
special pair.
1. Setup. B starts by setting pk = ga and R = gc , where ga, gc are the inputs of the BDH problem, and returns
(G1,GT , k, g, p, e, pk) toA.
2. H queries. At any time the adversary A can request the hash function H of the input mi. To respond to these queries,
algorithm B will maintain an H-List which consists of tuple (mi,H(mi), αi, coini) as explained later. For a query mi, B
responds as follows.
(a) If there exists a tuple (mi,H(mi), αi, coini) on the H-List,B will return H(mi) toA.
(b) Otherwise,B will generate a random coin coini ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr[coini = 1] = 1qs+1 .
(c) If coini = 1,B chooses αi ∈R Zp and computes H(mi) = gb · gαi where gb is the input of the BDH problem.
(d) Otherwise, coini = 0 andB chooses αi ∈R Zp and computes H(mi) = gαi .
(e) FinallyB returns H(mi) toA and adds (mi,H(mi), αi, coini) to the list H-List .
3. Signature Queries. At any time the adversaryA can request the signature of the messagemi. We assume thatmi already
appears on the H-List in a tuple (mi,H(mi), αi, coini). Otherwise, B makes an H query itself to ensure that such a tuple
exists on the H-List .
(a) If coini = 0, then B responds to A with the signature σi = pkαi . Note that σi is a valid signature as e(σi, g) =
e(pkαi , g) = e(pk,H(mi)).
(b) Otherwise, coini = 1, andB terminates the simulation and reports failure.
4. Server-Aided Verification Queries. At any time the adversary A can make the server-aided verification of a
message–signature pair (mi, σi). We assume that mi already appears on the H-List . Otherwise, B makes an H query
itself to ensure such tuple exists on the H-List . Recall thatB has made a guess at the beginning of the game that the first
special pair is the jth server-aided verification query.
(a) For the ith query (mi, σi)where i < j:
• If mi has never appeared as one of the signature queries before this server-aided verification query, then B will
execute the server-aided verification protocol with A but output Invalid at the end of the protocol, no matter
whatA’s response is in the protocol. It is clear that ifB’s guess of the first special pair is correct, thenB’s output
will be correct as well.
• Otherwise,A has issuedmi as one of signature queries andB answered with a valid signature which is denoted as
σ ′i . In this case,B will execute the protocol withA. First,B sends (σi, R) toA. Then,A responds with K1. Finally,
B will output Valid if K1 = e(σ ′i , R). Otherwise, it outputs Invalid.
(b) Otherwise, i = j and (mj, σj) is a special pair. Let the corresponding tuple on the H-List be (mj,H(mj), αj, coinj). If
coinj = 0, B reports failure and aborts. Otherwise, coinj = 1 and H(mj) = gb · gαj . B executes the server-aided
verification protocol with A, by sending (σj, R) to A. As the response, A will send K1 to B. As (mj, σj) is a special
pair, the server-aided verification protocol SA-Verify will output Valid. We have K1 = e(g, g)abc · e(ga, gc)αj as
pk = ga,H(mj) = gb · gαj and R = gc . B terminates the simulation and outputs K1 · e(ga, gc)−αj as the solution to
the given instance of the BDH problem.
We now compute the probability thatB solves the BDH problem if E1 happens. All the following events are required forB’s
success.
1. B does not abort as the result ofA’s signature queries. This happens with probability (1− 1/(qs + 1))qs ≥ 1/e. Here, e
is the base of the natural logarithm.
2. B makes a correct guess of the special pair, which happens with probability 1/qv . This also guarantees that before B
terminates the simulation, all server-aided verification queries fromA can be correctly answered.
3. The above two events happen and coinj = 1 for the special pair (mj, σj). This happens with probability at least 1/(qs+1).
Therefore, if the event E1happens, the probability thatB can solve the random instance of the BDHproblem is Pr[Succ|E1] ≥
1
eqv(qs+1) .
The Event Succ|E2. If the event E2 happens, then there is no special pair inA’s server-aided verification queries.B responds
toA’s queries as follows.
1. Setup, H queries, Signature Queries.B responds to these queries in the same way as was described in the case Succ|E1.
2. Server-Aided Verification Queries. At any time the adversaryA can make a server-aided verification query of (mi, σi).
(a) If mi has never appeared as one of signature queries before this query, then B will execute the server-aided
verification protocol with A but output Invalid at the end of the protocol, no matter what A’s response is in the
protocol. It is clear that if E2 happens, thenB’s output will be correct as well.
(b) Otherwise, A has issued mi as one of signature queries and B answered with a valid signature which is denoted as
σ ′i . In this case,B will execute the protocol withA. First,B sends (σi, R) toA. Then,A responds with K1. Finally,B
will output Valid if K1 = e(σ ′i , R). Otherwise, it will output Invalid.
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If B does not abort the simulation, A will output a message–signature pair (m∗, σ ∗) with the restriction described in
Section 3.1 and convince B that σ ∗ is valid by SA-Verify. Let the corresponding tuple on the H-List be (m∗,H(m∗),
α∗, coin∗). If coin∗ = 0, B reports failure and aborts. Otherwise, coin∗ = 1 and H(m∗) = gb · gα∗ . B then executes the
server-aided verification protocol SA-VerifywithA. Let K ∗1 be the response ofA in SA-Verify. IfA can successfully prove
that σ ∗ is a valid signature, then K ∗1 = e(g, g)abc · e(ga, gc)α∗ as pk = ga,H(m∗) = gb · gα∗ and R = gc . B thus can
output K ∗1 · e(ga, gc)−α∗ as the solution to the given instance of the BDH problem.
We now compute the probability thatB solves the BDH problem if E2 happens. All the following events are required forB’s
success.
1. B does not abort as the result ofA’s signature queries. This happens with probability (1− 1/(qs + 1))qs ≥ 1/e. Here, e
is the base of the natural logarithm.
2. B correctly answers all server-aided verification queries fromA. This happens with probability 1 if E2 happens.
3. A can successfully prove the validity of σ ∗ by SA-Verify. This happens with the probability ε ifB’s simulation does not
fail.
4. The above three events happen and coin∗ = 1 for the pair (m∗, σ ∗). This happens with probability at least 1/(qs + 1).
Therefore, if the event E2 happens, the probability thatB can solve the given instance of BDH problem is
Pr[Succ|E2] ≥ ε
e(qs + 1) .
Recall that Pr[Succ|E1] ≥ 1
eqv(qs+1) and Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] = 1; then the probability thatB can solve the given instance of the
BDH problem is
Pr[Succ] = Pr[Succ|E1] Pr[E1] + Pr[Succ|E2] Pr[E2]
= 1
eqv(qs + 1) Pr[E1] +
ε
e(qs + 1) Pr[E2]
≥ ε
eqv(qs + 1) (Pr[E1] + Pr[E2])
= ε
eqv(qs + 1) .
AlgorithmB’s running time is the same asA’s running time plus the time it takes to respond to (qh+qs+qv) random oracle
queries, qs signature queries and qv verification queries, and compute e(g, g)abc fromA’s output. Each requires at most one
pairing operation and one exponentiation which we assume takes time c(G1,GT ). Hence, the total running time is at most
t + c(G1,GT )(qh + 2qs + 2qv + 1). This completes the proof of Theorem 3. 
5. SAV-Σ secure against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks
As defined earlier (including Definition 3), the server does not know any valid signature of the messagem, when it tries
to use SA-Verify to convince the verifier that an invalid signature ofm is valid. In this section, we investigate the security of
SAV-Σ against collusion between the server and the signer, and propose server-aided verification protocols secure against
this attack.
5.1. Security of SAV-Σ against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks
If we allow the server and the signer to collude, the serverwill have valid signatures of anymessages. Thus, it is impossible
to give a unified security notion to capture both EUF-Σ and Soundness-SA-Verify simultaneously. With this in mind, we
nowdefine the soundness of the server-aided verification protocol SA-Verify against collusion and adaptive chosenmessage
attacks. In the game, the adversary is given the secret key of the signer.
Setup. The challenger C runs the algorithms ParamGen, KeyGen and SA-Verifier-Setup to obtain system parameter
param, one key pair (sk, pk) and VString. The adversaryA is given param and (sk, pk).
Queries. The adversaryA only needs to make Server-Aided Verification Queries. Proceeding adaptively, the adversaryA
can make at most qv such queries. The challenger C responds to each query in the same way as was described in
Definition 3.
Output. The adversaryA will output a message m∗. We denote asΩm∗ the set of valid signatures of m∗. The challenger C
chooses a random element σ ∗ inΩ \Ωm∗ . That is, σ ∗ is a random invalid signature ofm∗. We say thatAwins the
game if
SA-Verify(A,C(m
∗,σ∗,pk,VString)) = Valid.
Note that the challenge signature is chosen by the challenger, and is not given to the adversary. This is different from the
collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks defined in [21].
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Fig. 4. SA-Verify in SAV-Waters with soundness.
Table 3
Comparisons III.
Verification Pairing Exponentiation Multiplication
Waters 2 0 n(G1)
SAV-Waters 0 Fixed-base:
1(G1)+ 1(GT )
1(G1)+2(GT )
We define Soundness-SA-Verify-Adv A to be the probability that the adversary A wins in the above game, taken over
the coin tosses made byA and the challenger.
Definition 4. An adversaryA is said to (t, qv, ε)-break the soundness of SA-Verify in a SAV-Σ ifA runs in time at most t ,
makes at most qv server-aided verification queries, and Soundness-SA-Verify-Adv A is at least ε. The SA-Verify in a SAV-Σ
is (t, qv, ε)-sound against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks if there exists no adversary that (t, qv, ε)-breaks
it.
Definition 5. SAV-Σ is (t, qs, qv, ε)-secure against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks if Σ is (t, qs, ε)-
existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks and its server-aided verification protocol SA-Verify is
(t, qv, ε)-sound against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.
5.2. SAV-Waters secure against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks
In this section, we provide another server-aided verification protocol, which is based on the Waters signature [19] and
secure against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.
1. ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify. These algorithms are the same as those defined in Section 4.2.
2. SA-Verifier-Setup. Given the system parameters (G1,GT , k, g, p, e), V computes K1 = e(g, g). Then set D = gd. The
VString is K1.
3. SA-Verify. The verifier V and the server S interact with each other using the protocol described in Fig. 4.
Computation-Saving. From Table 3, the verifier in SAV-Waters described above only needs to compute one multiplication
on G1, one (fixed-base) exponentiation on G1, two multiplications on GT and one (fixed-base) exponentiation on GT . In
particular, there is no pairing operation. Thus,Φ- SA-Verify< Φ-Verify.
Security Proof of SAV-Waters Against Collusion and Chosen Message Attacks
Wewill show that the server-aided-verification protocol is sound against collusion and adaptive chosenmessage attacks.
Theorem 4. The server-aided-verification protocol described in Fig. 4 is (t, qv, 1p−1 )-sound against collusion and adaptive chosen
message attacks.
Proof. We will prove that the adversary’s probability of proving an invalid signature as valid is 1p−1 .
1. Setup. The challenger starts by choosing the secret key sk = x∈R Zp, and sets the public key as pk = (v⃗, PK) where
v⃗ = (Vi), i = 0, 1, . . . , n, and Vi ∈R G1. The challenger also computes K1 = e(g, g), then returns (G1,GT , e, p, sk, pk)
toA.
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2. Server-Aided-Verification Queries. At any time the adversaryA can make the server-aided-verification query (mi, σi).
The challenger executes the protocol SA-VerifywithA as described in Fig. 4.
3. Output. After all queries,A will output a messagem∗. LetΩm∗ be the valid signature ofm∗. As response, the challenger
will choose a random element σ ∗ = (σ ∗1 , σ ∗2 ) inG21 \Ωm∗ , that is, σ ∗ is a random element in the invalid signature space
ofm∗.
The challenger then executes SA-Verify with A as described in Fig. 4. The challenger selects d∗ ∈R Zp and computes
σ ′∗1 = σ ∗1 · gd∗ . After that, σ ′∗1 and σ ∗2 are sent to A, who will return K ∗2 and K ∗3 as the response. We now show that
K ∗2 = PK ·K ∗3 ·K d∗1 happenswith probability 1p−1 . The following analysis has a similar idea to the proof of the Cramer–Shoup
encryption scheme [23].
(a) The element σ ′∗1 sent toA does not constrain (σ
∗
1 , d
∗). This is because given σ ′∗1 , there are (p− 1) pairs (σ1i, di) that
satisfy the equation σ ′∗1 = σ1i · gdi , and (σ ∗, d∗) chosen by the challenger is just a random one among these p − 1
pairs. In other words, from the adversary’s viewpoint, each (σ1i, di) has equal probability of being (σ ∗, d∗). To make
our analysis clearer, we rewrite the equation σ ′∗1 = σ ∗1 · gd∗ as
DLgσ ′∗1 = DLgσ ∗1 + d∗. (1)
(b) SupposeA returns K ∗2 and K
∗
3 such that K
∗
2 = PK · K ∗3 · K d∗1 . We rewrite this equation as
DLe(g,g)K ∗2 = DLe(g,g)(PK · K ∗3 )+ d∗. (2)
If Eqs. (1) and (2) are linearly independent, then (σ ∗1 , d∗)will be uniquely determined,whichhappenswith probability
1
p−1 as (σ
∗
1 , d
∗) is randomly chosen from p− 1 pairs from the viewpoint of the adversary.
Otherwise, Eqs. (1) and (2) are linearly dependent. This requires that DLgσ ∗1 = DLe(g,g)(PK ·K ∗3 ), that is, e(σ ∗1 , g) =
PK · K ∗3 . This means that σ ∗1 is uniquely determined by K ∗3 . As σ ′∗1 sent toA does not constrain σ ∗1 , this happens also
with probability 1p−1 .
Therefore, the probability that SA-Verifywill output Valid is 1p−1 . This completes the proof of this theorem. 
5.3. SAV-BLS secure against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks
We now give a server-aided verification protocol for the BLS signature [20], which is secure against the collusion and
adaptive chosen message attacks.
1. ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify. These algorithms are the same as those defined in Section 4.3.
2. SA-Verifier-Setup. Given the system parameters (G1,GT , k, g, p, e,H), the verifier V computes K1 = e(g, g). The
VString is K1.
3. SA-Verify. The verifier V and the server S interact with each other using the protocol described in Fig. 5.
Computation-Saving. FromTable 4, the verifier in SAV-BLS described above only needs to compute onemultiplication onG1,
one (fixed-base) exponentiation on G1, one multiplication on GT and one (fixed-base) exponentiation on GT . In particular,
there is no pairing or map-to-point operation. Thus,Φ-SA-Verify< Φ-Verify.
Security Proof of SAV-BLS Against Collusion and ChosenMessage Attacks. We only need to show that the server-aided
verification protocol in Fig. 5 is sound against collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.
Theorem 5. The server-aided verification protocol described in Fig. 5 is (t, qv, 1p−1 )-sound against collusion and adaptive chosen
message attacks.
Proof. We prove that the adversary’s probability of proving an invalid signature as valid is 1p−1 , without any complexity
assumption.
1. Setup. The challenger starts by choosing the secret key sk = x∈R Zp, sets the public key as pk = gx and computes
K1 = e(g, g), then returns (G1,GT , k, g, p, e,H) and (sk, pk) toA.
2. Server-Aided Verification Queries. At any time the adversary A can make the server-aided verification query (mi, σi).
The challenger executes the protocol SA-VerifywithA as described in Fig. 5.
3. Output. After all the queries, A will output a message m∗. As a response, the challenger will choose a random element
σ ∗ in G1 \ {H(m∗)sk}, that is, σ ∗ is a random element in the invalid signature space ofm∗.
The challenger then executes SA-Verify with A as described in Fig. 5. The challenger selects r∗ ∈R Zp and computes
σ ′∗ = σ ∗ · g r∗ . After that, σ ′∗ is sent toA, who will return K ∗2 and K ∗3 as the response. We now show that K ∗2 = K ∗3 · K r∗1
happens with probability 1p−1 . The following analysis use a technique similar to that in the proof of the Cramer–Shoup
encryption scheme [23].
(a) The element σ ′∗ sent toA does not constrain the distribution of (σ ∗, r∗). This is because given σ ′∗, there are (p− 1)
pairs (σi, ri) that satisfy the equation σ ′∗ = σi · g ri , and (σ ∗, r∗) chosen by the challenger is just a random one among
these p−1 pairs. In other words, from the adversary’s viewpoint, each (σi, ri) has equal probability of being (σ ∗, r∗).
To make our analysis clearer, we rewrite the equation σ ′∗ = σ ∗ · g r∗ as
DLgσ ′∗ = DLgσ ∗ + r∗. (1)
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Fig. 5. SA-Verify in SAV-BLS with soundness.
Table 4
Comparisons IV.
Verification Pairing Exponentiation Multiplication Map-to-point
BLS 2 0 0 1
SAV-BLS 0 Fixed-base:
1(G1)+ 1(GT )
1(G1)+1(GT ) 0
(b) SupposeA returns K ∗2 and K
∗
3 such that K
∗
2 = K ∗3 · K r∗1 . We rewrite this equation as
DLe(g,g)K ∗2 = DLe(g,g)K ∗3 + r∗. (2)
IfDLgσ ∗ ≠ DLe(g,g)K ∗3 , then Eqs. (1) and (2) are linearly independent. It follows that r∗ satisfies Eq. (2)with probability
1
p−1 , as (σ
∗, r∗) is randomly chosen from p− 1 pairs from the viewpoint of the adversary.
Otherwise, DLgσ ∗ = DLe(g,g)K ∗3 , that is, e(σ ∗, g) = K ∗3 . This means that σ ∗ is uniquely determined by K ∗3 . As σ ′∗
sent toA does not constrain the distribution of σ ∗, this happens also with probability 1p−1 .
Therefore, the probability that SA-Verifywill output Valid is 1p−1 . This completes the proof of this theorem. 
Remark. Recently a new type of ‘‘collusion attacker’’ was defined in [24]. In the new definition, an attacker is given a key
pair (skf , pkf ) and a public key pk, while the challenger keeps the corresponding private key sk as secret. The attacker
is said to break the soundness of the SAV protocol if he/she can find a message/signature pair (m∗, σ ∗) which is valid
under the public key pkf and can be proved as valid under pk via the SAV protocol. As one can see, the adversary defined
in [24] actually belongs to those defined in Section 3.1, i.e., the adversary does not have the private key but can choose
the challenge message/signature pair. (Also notice that the key pair (skf , pkf ) can also be generated by the adversaries
defined in Section 5.1.) This is different from the collusion attacks defined in Section 5.1, where the adversary is given the
private sk but is not allowed to choose the challenge signature σ ∗. As shown in [24], SAV protocols secure against collusion
attacks defined in this section might be existentially forgeable, since adversaries in these two notions are different. It is
certainly more desirable if SAV protocols are secure against collusion attacks where adversaries are also allowed to choose
the challenge message/signature pair. These protocols will be investigated in the following section.
5.4. SAV-Σ secure against strong collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks
As we can see in Section 5.1, it is the challenger who chooses an invalid signature of the messagem∗ (wherem∗ is chosen
by the adversary). This section considers strong collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks, where the adversary has
the ability to choose the invalid signature under the messagem∗. The concrete game is defined as follows.
Setup. The challenger C runs the algorithms ParamGen, KeyGen and SA-Verifier-Setup to obtain system parameter
param, one key pair (sk, pk) and VString. The adversaryA is given param and (sk, pk).
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Fig. 6. SA-Verify in SAV-BLS with soundness.
Table 5
Comparisons V.
Verification Pairing Exponentiation Multiplication Map-to-point
BLS 2 0 0 1
SAV-BLS 1 2(G1)+ 2(GT ) 1(G1)+1(GT ) 1
Queries. The adversaryA only needs to make Server-Aided Verification Queries. Proceeding adaptively, the adversaryA
can make at most qv such queries. The challenger C responds to each query in the same way as was described in
Definition 3.
Output. The adversaryAwill output a messagem∗ and choose a random element σ ∗ inΩ \Ωm∗ , whereΩm∗ denotes the
set of valid signatures ofm∗. We say thatAwins the game if SA-Verify (A,C(m∗,σ∗,pk,VString)) = Valid.
We define Strong-Soundness-SA-Verify-Adv A to be the probability that the adversary A wins in the above game, taken
over the coin tosses made byA and the challenger.
Definition 6. An adversary A is said to (t, qv, ε)-strongly break the soundness of SA-Verify in a SAV-Σ if A runs in time
at most t , makes at most qv server-aided verification queries, and Strong-Soundness-SA-Verify-Adv A is at least ε. The
SA-Verify in a SAV-Σ is (t, qv, ε)-sound against strong collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks if there exists no
adversary that (t, qv, ε)-breaks it.
Definition 7. SAV-Σ is (t, qs, qv, ε)-secure against strong collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks ifΣ is (t, qs, ε)-
existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks and its server-aided verification protocol SA-Verify is
(t, qv, ε)-sound against strong collusion and adaptive chosen message attacks.
SAV-BLS Secure Against Strong Collusion and Adaptive Chosen Message Attacks
We now give a server-aided verification protocol for BLS signature [20], which is secure against the strong collusion and
adaptive chosen message attacks.
1. ParamGen, KeyGen, Sign, Verify. These algorithms are the same as those defined in Section 4.3.
2. SA-Verifier-Setup. Given the system parameters (G1,GT , k, g, p, e,H), the verifier V computes K1 = e(g, g). The
VString is K1.
3. SA-Verify. The verifier V and the server S interact with each other using the protocol described in Fig. 5.
Computation-Saving. FromTable 5, the verifier in SAV-BLS described above needs to compute onemultiplication onG1, one
(fixed-base) exponentiation onG1, one exponentiation onG1, onemultiplication onGT , one (fixed-base) exponentiation on
GT , one exponentiation on GT and one pairing. This is also less than the computational cost required in the original verify
algorithm.
Theorem 6. The server-aided verification protocol described in Fig. 6 is (t, qv, 1p )-strong-sound against collusion and adaptive
chosen message attacks.
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Proof. We prove that the adversary’s probability of proving an invalid signature as valid is 1p , without any complexity
assumption.
1. Setup. The challenger starts by choosing the secret key sk = x∈R Zp, sets the public key as pk = gx and computes
K1 = e(g, g), then returns (G1,GT , k, g, p, e,H) and (sk, pk) toA.
2. Server-Aided Verification Queries. At any time the adversary A can make the server-aided verification query (mi, σi).
The challenger executes the protocol SA-VerifywithA as described in Fig. 6.
3. Output. After all queries,Awill output a messagem∗ along with a random element σ ∗ inG1 \ {H(m∗)sk}, that is, σ ∗ is a
random element in the invalid signature space ofm∗.
The challenger then executes SA-VerifywithA as described in Fig. 6. The challenger selects r∗1 , r
∗
2 ∈R Zp and computes
σ ′∗ = σ ∗r∗1 · g r∗2 . After that, σ ′∗ is sent to A, who will return K ∗2 as the response. We now show that K ∗2 = K ∗r
∗
1
3 · K r∗1
happens with probability 1p . The following analysis uses a technique similar to that in the proof of the Cramer–Shoup
encryption scheme [23].
(a) The element σ ′∗ sent toA does not constrain the distribution of (r∗1 , r
∗
2 ). This is because given σ
′∗, there are p pairs
(r1i, r2i) that satisfy the equation σ ′∗ = σ r1ii · g r2i , and (r∗1 , r∗2 ) chosen by the challenger is just a random one among
these p pairs. In other words, from the adversary’s viewpoint, each (r1i, r2i) has equal probability of being (r∗1 , r
∗
2 ). To
make our analysis clearer, we rewrite the equation σ ′∗ = σ ∗r∗1 · g r∗2 as
DLgσ ′∗ = r∗1 · DLgσ ∗ + r∗2 . (1)
(b) SupposeA returns K ∗2 such that K
∗
2 = K ∗r
∗
1
3 · K r
∗
2
1 . We rewrite this equation as
DLe(g,g)K ∗2 = r∗1 · DLe(g,g)K ∗3 + r∗2 . (2)
As required, σ ∗ is an invalid signature of m∗, i.e. DLgσ ∗ ≠ DLe(g,g)K ∗3 . It follows that Eqs. (1) and (2) are linearly
independent and (r∗1 , r
∗
2 )will be uniquely determined. This happenswith probability
1
p as (r
∗
1 , r
∗
2 ) is randomly chosen
from p pairs from the viewpoint of the adversary.
Therefore, the probability that SA-Verifywill output Valid is 1p . This completes the proof of this theorem. 
6. Conclusion
We formally defined the existential unforgeability of server-aided verification signatures to expand the existing security
requirements in server-aided verification signatures. We analyzed the Girault–Lefranc scheme from Asiacrypt 2005 and
proposed the first server-aided verificationWaters signature (whose existential unforgeability does not rely on the random
oracle model) and server-aided verification BLS signature (whose existential unforgeability is proved in the random oracle
model). We defined the security of server-aided verification signatures under collusion attacks and strong collusion attacks.
Concrete constructions secure against such attacks were also presented.
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